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Abstract
Background: Public-private partnership (PPP) has been suggested as a tool to assist governments in lower to middle
income countries fulfil their responsibilities in the efficient delivery of health services. In Tanzania, although the idea of
PPP has existed for many years in the health sector, there has been limited coordination, especially at a district level –
which has contributed to limited health gains or systems strengthening obviously seen as a result of PPP.
Methods: This case study was conducted in the Bagamoyo district of Tanzania, and employed in-depth interviews,
document reviews, and observations methods. A stakeholder analysis was conducted to understand power distribution
and the interests of local actors to engage non-state actors. In total 30 in-depth interviews were conducted with key
informants that were identified from a stakeholder mapping activity. The initial data analysis guided further data
collection in an iterative process. The provision of Reproductive and Child Health Services was used as a context. This
study draws on the decision-space framework.
Results: Study findings reveal several forms of informal partnerships, and the untapped potential of non-state actors.
Lack of formal contractual agreements with private providers including facilities that receive subsidies from the
government is argued to contribute to inappropriate distribution of risk and reward leading to moral hazards.
Furthermore, findings highlight weak capacity of governing bodies to exercise oversight and sanctions, which is
acerbated by weak accountability linkages and power differences. Disempowered Council Health Services Board, in
relation to engaging non-state actors, is shown to impede PPP initiatives.
Conclusion: Effective PPP policy implementation at a local level depends on the capacity of local government officials
to make choices that would embrace relational elements dynamics in strategic plans. Orientation towards collaborative
efforts that create value and enable its distribution is argued to facilitate healthy partnership, and in return, strengthen
a district health system. This study highlights a need for new social contracts that will support integrative collaboration
at the local level and bring all non-state actors to the centre of the district health system.
Keywords: Partnership, Engagement, Collaboration, Service level agreement, Non-state actors, Value, Contractual
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Background
Introduction
Through its national public-private partnership (PPP) pol-
icy the Government of Tanzania recognises the important
role of PPP in achieving social goals [1–4]. This policy was
adopted in 2009 and later followed by the PPP Act in 2010
[5]. It stresses a need for the proper analysis of supporting
structures (political, economic and social structures) to en-
sure there is appropriate distribution of risks and rewards
between collaborating parties [6]. The Health Sector
Strategic Plan III (2009-2015), further highlights the need
to address gaps in health care delivery by avoiding overlaps
and unnecessary competition with more emphasis on ser-
vice level agreements (SLAs) [3]. This is also featured in the
Health Sector Strategic Plan IV (2015-2020) [7]. SLAs are
forms of contractual arrangements that provide opportun-
ities for private providers to access public funding [3]. If
well designed, SLAs are expected to address externalities,
resource complementarity or recombination, and potential
benefits gained between two entities leading to improved
equity, efficiency and quality of services delivered [4, 8–11].
The increased recognition of PPP in the health sector is
also seen in other emerging markets and large economies
[12]. This trend is expected to grow globally as govern-
ments continue to face fiscal constraints in delivering social
services [13–16]. The nature and scope of private providers
differs from one country to the next, and the way in which
their roles are incorporated into the national and sub-
national health systems also vary [10, 17, 18]. For example,
in high income countries, contractual governance mecha-
nisms are seen to be more advanced, may constitute a large
project (such as the private finance initiative in the United
Kingdom), and tend to consider performance management
measures and value creation elements. Several studies have
explored the nature of such formal arrangements between
collaborating parties [10, 12, 19]. In lower to middle income
countries (LMICs), however, the contractual governance
mechanisms are seen to be less developed. Relational gov-
ernance, mostly with faith-based non-profit providers
(which does not necessary take into account relational ele-
ments) is highlighted in the literature [8, 13]. The oversight
of private providers is minimal, if any exist [16].
In Tanzania, at a district level, the private sector is highly
heterogeneous, and consists of private not-for-profit
(PNFP) providers such as faith-based providers and volun-
tary services, private for-profit (PFP) providers, local and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), pri-
vate practitioners operating alone, corporate private clinics
and hospitals, traditional practice, informal and formal drug
vendors, pharmacies, and stand-alone diagnostic laborator-
ies [2]. Non-state actors provide a wide range of services:
from preventive, to curative, to rehabilitative services - and
in some areas are involved in pre-service training, pharma-
ceutical supply and construction and maintenance of
facilities [4]. Facility-based PFP providers are more concen-
trated in urban and peri-urban areas [20–22]. PNFP pro-
viders, drug vendors, traditional practice and sporadically
stand-alone diagnostic laboratories tend to operate in hard
to reach remote areas [4, 23, 24].
There are a large number of PPP-related policy docu-
ments and reports available in Tanzania, but fewer empirical
studies that show how these policy documents and reports
are implemented. The available literature is also focused
mainly on PPP at the national level. This study, using a
qualitative lens, asks the following question: What are the
governance-related health systems barriers that hinder
implementation of PPP at a district level in Tanzania? The
study intends to add knowledge on how to engage non-
state actors, and in return contributes to a district health
system’s strengthening approach.
Conceptual background
Public-private partnership may take different arrangements
between the government and private sector entities. The
collaboration may involve renovation, construction, main-
tenance, management and provision of services in a whole
or in part [6, 15, 18]. In other settings, outsourcing has
been used as a modality to either tap resources from non-
state actors (resource complementarity for service delivery)
- when there are changes in the health care market condi-
tions, or help a public entity shift its focus to a core
business (service delivery) - by contracting out non-core
business such as laundry, catering, housekeeping, and
security services [18, 25].
Although, the idea of PPP has existed for several years in
Tanzania, mixed performance is observed - influenced by
sometimes ineffective governance mechanisms at the sub-
national level [13]. It is further argued that the slow pro-
gress in improving overall health system’s performance can
be ascribed to limited capacity to coordinate resources,
identify effective technical strategy, and scale-up effect-
ive interventions, and inadequate managerial practices
[26–28]. It has been highlighted that there is limited
understanding and recognition of the concept of PPP at
the district level [4, 24]. Furthermore, missed opportun-
ities to introduce SLAs in areas where some population
groups are underserved have been highlighted [4]. For
example, in other locations private providers are the
only facilities operating in a given geographical area,
but for those who are entitled to exemptions, fee
exemptions do not apply. This is also seen when public
facilities have stock-outs of essential medicines, which
happens frequently [21, 22, 28]. This indicates the need
for effective mechanisms to provide services based on
need, and not ability to pay, by working together with
all types of providers.
Widely promoted reforms in retail services in the last
decade are seen to contribute to dispersed Accredited Drug
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Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs), also known as essential drug
shops. Although these reforms were initiated to address the
rural and peri-urban local need for pharmaceutical and
medical supplies, they seem to bring in new relational dy-
namics that require effective governance mechanisms [23].
The same trend is seen with stand-alone private diagnostic
laboratories [4]. Gaps have been highlighted with these re-
forms, for example lack of quality assurance leading to poor
quality of services, and uncontrolled price of commodities,
which exacerbates inequity [4, 21, 28]. Such reforms could
lead to collaboration, competition, and conflict among in-
volved entities in the political arena, which may further
contribute to system underperformance [29].
The revised District Health Management Information Sys-
tem (DHMIS) provides an opportunity to use reliable data
to make evidence-based decisions that can inform contrac-
tual negotiations and performance management with non-
state actors [30–32]. With the potential for information
asymmetry however, this would depend on how non-state
actors are engaged at the district level, and relationships
established with shared values [33]. It is argued that in a
long-term partnership formal contracts and trust, when
combined, may provide a desired policy outcome [34]. The
decentralization offers another opportunity to engage non-
state actors in planning and policy dialogue at the local level
[35]. This is also because local authorities are more familiar
with who non-state actors are in their areas, and could easily
monitor their performance, and improve systems perform-
ance [16, 36, 37].
There is strong PPP technical coordination at the national
level in Tanzania as demonstrated by the existence of the
PPP Unit under the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
(MoHSW), PPP-Technical Working Group, and various
PPP dialogues [1, 4]. At the district level, however, the strong
coordination would depend on the district health system’s
governance supported by appropriate competencies to effect
change. This includes the ability to facilitate inclusive policy
dialogue and strategic plans at the local level that would im-
prove the accountability and decision-making processes in
order to achieve health goals [35, 37]. It is further appreci-
ated that governance is a ‘key mechanism permitting value
creation and shape its distribution’ [11].
This study draws on the decision-space framework
(Fig. 1), which considers a decision-space as the amount
of choices (degree of autonomy) transferred to local of-
ficials in a decentralized system [35]. This study focused
on the decision-space in service organisations more
broadly, and on contracting with private providers in
particular. The characteristics of local actors in PPP, and
the type of choices local officials (as agents) can make
to improve system performance through PPP were also
explored. The local fiscal space is considered, but how
finances and other incentives are allocated from the
central government-the principal, and PPP central
governing rules as defined by law were not within the
scope of this study.
Methods
A case study approach was employed to gain an under-
standing of multiple interconnected factors underpinning
PPP [38, 39]. Bagamoyo district, the district of focus in this
study, in the Eastern zone of Tanzania is situated 75 km
North of Dar-es-Salaam, the main business and trading city
in the country. This district has an urban-rural population
presenting appropriate district for this case study. Baga-
moyo district was selected for the study primarily on the
basis of research access and relevance to the topic.
Bagamoyo district has one hospital, which is publicly
owned, while private facilities operate at levels of health
centres and dispensaries [40]. This presents a difference
with other districts in Tanzania, which often have faith-
based appointed district hospitals known as Council Desig-
nated Hospitals. However, with the decentralized system,
the governance structure is the same across all districts in
Tanzania. The policy leadership and stewardship role is
provided by the MoHSW, and the operational role is
undertaken by local government [3].
Since PPP involves multiple implementing partners,
provision of Reproductive and Child Health Services
(RCHS) was used as the context or as a tracer to uncover
the socio-political complexity in PPP policy implementation
[41]. Based on MoHSW guidelines RCHS are considered as
essential services, some services are required to be provided
by private providers free of charge, and in the retail sector
there is a fee and services may be provided without doctor’s
consultation [4, 42]. The focus on RCHS at a district level
was expected to provide the complexity expected in PPP,
and simultaneously make this study manageable.
The sample of stakeholders for this study was purpose-
fully selected from a stakeholder map (see Additional file 1)
that was established after a stakeholder analysis. The stake-
holder analysis was conducted to understand power distri-
bution and the interests of local actors to engage non-state
actors. Consideration was given to the two parliamentary
constituencies in the district (Bagamoyo and Chalinze), in
order to get a proper representation of non-state actors,
given political influence that shapes actors relations [41].
To ensure all levels at the district were represented, two
divisions from each constituency were purposefully
selected, followed by one ward from each selected division
and one village from each selected ward. The selection was
based on the scale of RCH initiatives in those areas (large
scale and small-scale initiatives) and was done through
document review that included monthly, quarterly and an-
nual reports, and the Comprehensive Council Health Plan
(CCHP), as well as initial interviews with key informants.
Data collection employed in-depth interviews with key
informants, observations of participants, and document
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review methods. For governing committees at different
levels in the district, either the chairman or secretary partic-
ipated in interview. For non-state actors, owners or man-
agers of a facility or particular service were interviewed.
This included dispensaries, health centres, maternity home,
pharmacies, essential drug shops, ADDOs, NGOs, research
institute, and private company through Corporate Social
Responsibility. The saturation point was reached with 30 in-
terviews in total. A social network sketch (see Additional
file 2) was used for each interview as a tool to facilitate iden-
tification of actors’ linkages or interactions – including es-
tablishing the capacity to supply information or respond to/
impose sanction (Table 1). To ascertain whether PPP mech-
anisms that do exist are successful (effective) the focus was
on how these mechanisms have contributed to improved
equity in accessing care (access based on need, not ability to
pay), availability of essential medicines, and quality of care.
Written consent was obtained for interviews (with voice re-
cording in most cases) and when conducting observations.
All scripts were coded, and no personal identifiers were
used. Field notes were used to collect observation data, fo-
cusing on physical interactions and discussions between pri-
vate providers and service users. Document reviews and
observations assisted to identify other RCHS providers, and
establish if there were SLAs that exist within the local dis-
trict authority, how the SLAs were initiated, and the type of
the agreement (to determine how answerability and sanc-
tion are taken into account).
Recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim in Swa-
hili and then translated to English. This was then followed
by manual coding, organising and reorganising data and
emerging themes. The initial analysis guided further data
collection in an iterative process. Data from each category
of non-state actors (Table 1) were analysed and triangu-
lated with observational and documentary review data
separately. Themes were generated for each category, and
then interrelated across categories to identify emerging
patterns. Reflexivity was considered to manage authors’
influence on the findings. Respondent validation was insti-
tuted to ensure meaning was not distorted.
Results
In this case study a number of important themes
emerged that include factors that hinder and support
PPP. In this article, we report mainly on factors that hin-
der the implementation of the PPP policy in Bagamoyo
district in Tanzania. Findings are summarized in Fig. 1.
Public-private partnership and governing bodies:
Challenges and limitations
There are health governing organs at all three levels in
the district. The District Council Team, Council Social
Services Committee, Council Health Services Board
(CHSB) and Council Health Management Team (CHMT)
at the district level, the Ward Development Committee,
and Ward Health Committee at the ward level, and the
Village Health Committee, which was also referred by
community members as Facility Health Committee for a
respective public dispensary in the village.
Based on available guidelines, at the district level,
the higher governing body with the private sector
representation is the CHSB. However, in Bagamoyo
District, the CHSB is not strong as private sector rep-
resentation lacks authenticity. This is seen from re-
sponses from facility managers and owners of ADDO,
pharmacies and stand-alone diagnostic laboratories.
As one participant said:
“I have heard of the CHSB, but I don’t know what is
usually discussed. We don’t have a representative. We
(private providers) are considering forming an association
and then appoint leaders, who would then be our
representatives. But we have not yet managed to form
that association” (Participant 21 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Members of CHSB are endorsed by the Ward Develop-
ment Committee, after demonstrating interest to be mem-
bers, and then assessed by the CHMT, before being
recommended to the District Executive Director for ap-
pointment. However, one of the ward officials noted that
the endorsement of non-state actors’ representatives to
CHSB does not take into account the ability of an individ-
ual to mobilize others to promote public interest:
“There was one person from this ward who completed
the application form for board’s membership, and we
(ward officials) did approve it…Those positions (to be
a CHSB member) are advertised and forms are
usually made available at ward offices…It is very
difficult to forward negative comments…The only time
we can deny an individual this position is
when that person is mentally not normal”
(Participant 20 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Although the CHMT is very strong as it has personnel
with strong biomedical skills and other resources to their
disposal, they are more inclined towards public facilities.
This is acerbated by the public distrust of the private sec-
tor, as a significant number of those who operate private
practice are government employees. This was the response
from one of key informants:
“The relationship with private providers is not well
perceived by the public. There is a perception that they
(public and private staff ) favour each other. The
main argument is items are embezzled from the
public facilities, and get sold in private facilities”
(Participant 23 - Bagamoyo 2014).
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The District Council Team is very strong and
makes executive decisions; however, it is more in-
clined towards the public than the private sector. As
a result the Council Team directs the CHMT and
CHSB, which also has some CHMT members as
board members, to focus on public facilities. The
Council Team focuses more on how resources are
channelled to public facilities in order to win voters’
popularity rather than on strategies that would im-
prove equity, efficiency and quality of care. The
CHSB has the potential to foster the engagement of
non-state actors, however the CHSB is weak as it
lacks resources for effective PPP implementation:
“The big role of the CHSB is to control procurement
and distribution of drugs and other medical supplies
at public facilities. The linkage between other
committees and the CHSB is on how public
complaints are conceived at lower levels and how they
get channelled to the CHSB” (Participant 25 -
Bagamoyo 2014).
There are wards where the Ward Health Committees
do not exist, and in other wards the Ward Health Com-
mittees do exist but are weak in terms of the PPP policy
implementation as they have limited understanding of
PPP as a concept or strategy:
“I would say our committee (Ward Health Committee)
is non-functional, completely
non-functional since last year. We tried to
revive it but there were complaints among
members about general skills development”
(Participant 20 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Fig. 1 Study framework and key findings guided by the decision-space framework [35]. The study design is guided by this framework, with a
focus on decentralization. Key findings (important sub-themes) are provided that corespond to a respective domain on the framework
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Village (Public Facility) Health Committees have lim-
ited scope and their main focus is on public facilities.
Like all other committees, Village (Public Facility)
Health Committees have limited capacity to demand in-
formation from non-state actors, and exercise oversight
and sanctions:
“There are a lot of issues that we don’t know.
We are only two of us (me and the in-charge
of the public facility in the village) who attended
training at the district, and it was a brief session.
You cannot grasp everything in such a short
training” (Participant 24 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Strategic decisions to improve responsiveness: Limited
inclusion of actors in planning and decision-making
It was revealed by key informants that the CHMT pre-
pares the Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP)
annually that has to be endorsed by the District Council
Team before being approved by the Prime Minister‘s Of-
fice Regional Administration and Local Government
(PMO-RALG) and the MoHSW. All relevant policy guide-
lines are provided by the MoHSW. However, it was ob-
served in this research that the private sector is not
adequately represented in strategic decisions. The CHSB
is not directly involved in strategic planning. Those whose
names appear in the CCHP document as representatives
of non-state actors did not actually participate in strategic
sessions, reflecting inadequate inclusion of all services
providers. These were some responses from individuals
whose name appears on the CCHP document as a repre-
sentative of non-state actors:
“I used to attend strategic meetings back in
early 2000s as a representative of (non-state actors)
but after I took another job I stopped. So if
you tell me I am still a representative, that
is not right, I don’t attend those meetings…”
(Participant 1 – Bagamoyo 2014).
“I usually hear about it (CCHP). I have never
seen a copy…I don’t understand why my name should
appear in that document as a representative”
(Participant 9 – Bagamoyo 2014).
The local government is able to promote the Commu-
nity Health Fund (CHF) membership (a voluntary pre-
payment scheme), as directed by the Ministry’s guidelines.
Room to improve physical access by engaging non-state
actors is not well explored at the local level. This is com-
pounded by the requirement for matching subsidization
from the central government. In one of the visited vil-
lages, the NFP provider is easily accessible and well
equipped. Nevertheless, CHF members who also in-
clude secondary school girls cannot use that facility
as CHF is restricted to public facilities. Members are
required to walk a considerable distance to access
care. When medicines are out-of-stock, which is the
case in most public facilities in this district, they are
required to pay cash at private facilities or ADDOs:
“We (CHMT and CHSB) can make our decisions at
the district level after receiving guidelines from the
ministry however, for CHF members to receive
services from private providers we need to plan it
well. We have to get them (private providers)
sensitized. For now we have no options”
(Participant 17 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Regarding district health data, data available from
DHMIS, developed at the national level, are analysed
and discussed during the CHMT meetings. However, it
was demonstrated by one informant that collected data
is of poor quality, or not digestible or actionable to im-
prove PPP at the district level [30].
“In one activity you may find you have twenty
indicators. For example under DHMIS there are
about eight reports. At the same time there are
other reports required for each section such as
RCHS, PPP, etc… this becomes an additional
workload. There is no way you can get a good
quality report” (Participant 18 – Bagamoyo 2014).
It was further highlighted by another informant that
collected data is required by the Ministry, which reflects
lack of innovation to use available data to address emer-
ging challenges at the local level. For example, reports
from one facility-based private provider indicate a high
workload that does not match the number of staff avail-
able. However, little has been done to address this issue
despite the fact that this facility receives subsidies from
the government:
“The government needs to find a way to support us.
They (government) see our monthly reports.
In a month, a number of under-fives attended
here is between 1000 and 2000, new cases of
pregnant mothers is between 70 and 80, leave alone
‘re-attendance’. For family planning,
we report 200 clients. That is a very tough job…We really
struggle to get staff. And I understand even at government
facilities there is a shortage, but there are ways we can
work together on this” (Participant 21 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Limited inclusion of actors in planning and decision-
making is also reflected in how logistics are managed.
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There is a lack of innovation to facilitate change as seen
with Integrated Logistics System for supplies that come
from the Medical Store Department as a fixed stock.
There is limited flexibility to ensure that stock is con-
stantly maintained and an alternative source is easily
established with other local suppliers such as ADDO or
other facility-based providers through PPP, when there is a
shortage of supplies at public facilities:
“There are times you may receive the new stock from the
Medical Store Department but since it is a fixed stock you
may be in a situation where there is an increased need for
a particular treatment. In such a situation it becomes
very difficult to approach the company (the partner) for
assistance…” (Participant 30 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Performance accountability: Poor performance of
accountability structures
The CCHP does outline health outcomes that need
to be collectively achieved in the district. However,
there is a weak accountability linkage structure
among actors (Table 1), which is limited to supplying
information creating a room for non-compliance.
More emphasis is given to individual service’s entry
to the market through registration and licencing [43].
The feedback provided to facility-based providers
Table 1 PPP actors’ accountability matrix [44]
* No accountability linkages among actors
This was established using a social network sketch, where the interviewee was asked to map relational (formal and informal) linkages, and then explain the nature
of the relationship. The capacity to supply information or responded to sanction was analysed based on the ability of the respective provider to submit reports or
complying with directive from the authority or another party and consequence thereof: Weak →; Medium ; Strong
Likewise, the capacity to demand information or impose sanction was established based on how the authority or another party is empowered in this regard
and how it exercises power: Weak ↓; Medium ; Strong
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usually focus on gaps in quality of data collected and
areas for improvement in data collection only. It is
observed that a platform for explanation and justification,
leading to dialogue between the two parties has not been
created [44].
“There is no feedback provided once we have
submitted our reports. We don’t discuss anything
further. When you see the performance of
Bagamoyo District as a whole, you just assume you
were part of the success/ failure…and it is only when
you are lucky to attend higher level meetings”
(Participant 3 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Drugs shops and pharmacies provide family planning
pills and some sell injectable contraceptives, but per-
formance accountability in this aspect does not fall
under the district RCHS or PPP focal person. There is a
separate reporting system that has been created for
ADDOs and private pharmacies by the Pharmacy Coun-
cils - a regulatory body, which is centrally coordinated.
However, a lot of inconsistency of who complies and
who does not was observed. There is no evidence of the
reporting feeding back to the district from the Pharmacy
Council. For stand-alone private diagnostic laboratories,
most of them are not registered and do not submit re-
ports anywhere (Table 1).
“We are accountable to the pharmacy council, as we
submit our monthly reports to them…things like family
planning are included. So they get that information
straight from us…and how they use it is up to them”
(Participant 12 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Contractual governance: Lack of service level agreements
It was mentioned by one informant that in order to com-
ply with the requirement of establishing formal partner-
ships, the district is in the process of putting into place
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with facilities
that receive subsidies from the government. Another in-
formant mentioned that programs that are not funded
through the local government, such as those implemented
by NGOs and research project-oriented type of collabora-
tions, usually have contracts in the form of an MoU.
“A General MoU does exist… The partnership is
more research project-oriented…a laboratory was
constructed for the project… the scope of collaboration
is oriented towards the fund committed to the project”
(Participant 6 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Nevertheless, the district has not signed SLAs with
any non-state actor, including those who receive subsid-
ies from the government (Table 2).
“There are those services/ programs with contracts, for
example those who get funds from outside the
country… Programs that are funded by the local
government usually do not have contracts”
(Participant 23 – Bagamoyo 2014).
This lack of SLAs poses an inappropriate distribution
of risks and rewards, limiting mechanisms that have the
potential to promote public goals. For example, it was
mentioned by a key informant that the district hospital
occasionally gets free supplies from private providers
such as NFPs when they run out-of-stock, but NFP
providers buy supplies from wholesalers, at a higher
price when compared to the Medical Store Department.
In such a situation NFP providers may adjust to cope
with this new demand, and leave value-driven social
services [36].
“Occasionally, I have supported the district
hospital with drugs when they run out of stock…
We are not getting anything from the Medical
Store Department (MSD). We buy our supplies
from a wholesaler, but issue them free of charge.
We also give to the district hospital for free”
(Participant 3 – Bagamoyo 2014).
It was noted that a lack of written agreement at the
service level contributes to misunderstandings between
parties, and there are service interruptions that are expe-
rienced as a result. This was the case with Prevention of
Mother to Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT) service
provision where private providers receive subsidized
Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs and reagents from the gov-
ernment. In order to receive these supplies private pro-
viders have to submit their reports monthly, something
that is not done consistently. This has created an un-
healthy relationship between parties as there are those
government staff who strictly adhere to this require-
ment, and others who issue ARV drugs and reagents
without adhering to this requirement:
“With private providers, there is a challenge as
there are those who provide incomplete data, and
those who do not respond. For example data on
HIV, we need that information as they (private
providers) get subsidized reagents from the
government, but you will find that they (private
providers) provide incomplete information claiming
that they buy other items using their own resources”
(Participant 8 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Faith-based providers are faced with limited resources,
and are constrained against offering the services that
they would prefer. In addition, they now charge for
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services, which they would prefer not to charge. This is
the case with National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)
contracts where members are requested to pay in cash
when NHIF delays the reimbursement.
“…because we do not receive supplies from the
government, it is a problem. There are situations
when we get stuck, and we notify our clients/
patients (including those under NHIF) to
contribute… It is difficult to run a facility
if you buy something at TSH 20,000/-
and be expected to sell it at TSH 3,000/-…”
(Participant 29 – Bagamoyo 2014).
In another facility that is in the process of establishing
RCHS, it was mentioned that:
“We are building (additional buildings for new RCHS)
slowly, as the revenue that we get we have to distribute
it to salaries, buying medical supplies and drugs, as
well as food for staff. We are doing it slowly”
(Participant 27 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Additionally, the in-charge of one of the NFP pro-
viders indicated that the faith-based facility cannot start
providing RCHS if the government would not provide
staff. It was also noted that the interpretation of PPP is
Table 2 Types of partnerships with the local government that do exist in the district
Type of Providers Type of Contractual
Agreement
Type of Collaboration
Faith-Based Provider None Provision of RCHS but excludes family planning. Supplies are
provided free of charge, and staff are seconded from local
government. In return services offered are free of charge.
Faith-Based provider None Informal arrangements at village level for staff availability.
Faith-Based provider None Informal arrangements between public facilities, and the private
provider such as transfer of vaccines from one facility to the
other during power blackout.
PFP and PNFP providers None Informal arrangements for assistance when a public facility runs
out-of-stock such as for syringes, gloves, etc. Such assistance is
usually free of charge but at times a replacement has to be sent
at a later stage. Some private providers receive reagents for
Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) services.
Private pharmacies and faith-based
providers
General Contract Contractual arrangements between the National Health Insurance
Fund (NHIF) and private providers, but restricted to pharmacies
and faith-based providers. ADDO and private for profit are not
part of providers’ network.
Maternity home None Various forms of PPP arrangements with the maternity home
such as outreach- point for immunization, free of charge supplies
for some RCHS including Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission
of HIV (PMTCT) however, services are not entirely free, clients
have to contribute and the contribution is determined by the provider.
Jointly operated facility, private estate
company and government
None The company provided a building, house for seconded staff,
employ some staff, and procure and maintain a stock for its
employees, while the government provides, supplies through its
Integrated Logistics System for the community, and overall
oversight of the facility, and second staff. RCHS are provided as
per government guidelines.
Traditional Birth Attendant (TBAs) None There are some of facilities that have introduced incentives for
TBAs who facilitate referrals of pregnant mothers for facility delivery.
NGOs/ Private company MoU Partnership with NGOs (at local or national levels) in construction
of staff houses, renovation of facilities, sexual and reproductive
health initiatives, and HIV/AIDS prevention care and treatment initiatives.
Parastatal-based facilities None Parastatal-based facilities now operating like public facilities. Initially
they had their own arrangements managed through their
respective Ministerial headquarters.
Research Institute MoU Research project-oriented collaborations. The partnership is initiated
at a time when the project is commissioned, and ends at the end of
the project. It may involve construction and renovation of buildings,
operating, and then transfer.
Out sourcing None In case of out-of-stock at the Medical Store Department. The district
procurement officer would purchase a new stock from the appointed
contractor, though the contractor tends to change each year.
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limited to sharing staff – government seconding staff to
private providers.
“I have heard of service level agreement. We did
discuss this in this process of establishing RCHS,
because we wanted staff to be seconded here, and we
were ready to provide housing and allowances”
(Participant 16 – Bagamoyo 2014).
Discussion
Much effort is being made to promote PPP and the pri-
vate sector at the district level in Bagamoyo. However,
findings from this study highlight that these efforts are
not well-coordinated, and effective mechanisms have not
been established as yet to tap resources from or for the
private sector. Non-state actors are seen to be severely
marginalized in district strategic planning.
The presence of non-state actor representatives’ names
in the district strategic planning documents that are not
authentically represented, brings to light the characteristics
of actors who govern the decision-making process. As
argued by ‘public choice’ theorists, this reveals the self-
interest driven behaviour of local government officials and
the use of ‘power as thought control’ to influence decisions
of executive meeting at the district and national levels [45].
Core elements for PPP such as inclusion, transparent, and
ethical behaviours remain under-recognised [46].
It has been highlighted that faith-based providers are
often involved in policy dialogue, as they are seen to have
a common goal with the government [9, 13, 36, 47]. Find-
ings from this study, however, indicate NFP providers are
also not involved in decision-making at the district level.
Although faith-based providers are relatively well orga-
nised in Tanzania [16], and have strong representation
in policy dialogues at the national level through their
umbrella organisation (The Christian Social Services
Commission) [4], in this case study they are weakly rep-
resented at a district level.
Local governments are expected to have more
decision-making power on how funds are spent and with
what type of provider [4]. However, this study reveals
uneven power distribution between governing bodies at
the district level. The CHMT is equipped with strong
personnel with biomedical skills, and other resources,
but perceives PPP narrowly. The District Council Team
is powerful and tends to influence decisions made by
CHMT and CHSB, however it is inclined to place polit-
ically motivated interests over value distribution, which
has been argued to affect the engagement of non-state
actors [11]. Study findings highlight limited skills on al-
locative efficiencies given competing priorities to im-
prove systems performance through PPP.
Findings from this study highlight many weak perform-
ance accountability linkages. The capacity to demand
information (supply information) and institute (respond
to) sanction and regulatory oversight are expected to
bridge the gap in the information asymmetry between the
principal-local government and agent-private providers
[37, 44]. Study findings here indicate a wide gap in infor-
mation sharing as the relationship that is seen is that of
‘regulator and regulated type’ [16]. Relational elements
dynamics such as commitment to shared values, high
level of trust and interactive problem-solving are not
perceived as centrally important by the local govern-
ment officials in district planning, and are exacerbated
by the lack of dialogue with non-state actors. It has been
highlighted that relational elements, when they comple-
ment other governance mechanisms, are likely to yield
desirable outcome [31].
Other studies in Tanzania and Zimbabwe found that
regulation of private providers is oriented towards individ-
ual services rather than health systems organisation and/
or market-level challenges [43]. Similar findings are seen
in Bagamoyo district on how ADDO shops, private phar-
macies, and stand-alone private diagnostic laboratories are
regulated by bodies which do not have a direct link to the
office of the District Medical Officer or CHMT - further
fragmenting the system. Such governance arrangements,
which are less integrative, tend to give private actors
strong authority, and managerial discretion that come at
increased cost of supervision [31]. It has been highlighted
that engaging the private sector, in the form of informa-
tion exchange and in planning may yield better results -
rather than regulation alone [48].
Findings from this study reveal different forms of col-
laboration between the local government and the private
sector. However, partnerships with non-state actors are
informal with the exception of those not funded through
the local government, which have MoUs in place. Fur-
thermore, it has been argued that PPP as a concept is
narrowly perceived at the local level [24] which is also
demonstrated in this study. However, the current strat-
egy by this district to introduce MoUs for non-state ac-
tors who receive government subsides reflects how
policies are usually re-shaped and re-interpreted in un-
expected ways by front-line bureaucrats thus directly
affecting policy outcomes [26, 49, 50]. Contractual rela-
tions (such as MoUs) that provide for more flexibility re-
quire on-going analysis of contractual dynamics, of
social processes that promote trust, solidarity and infor-
mation exchange, in a context with a potential market
failure [34, 51]. This kind of effective coordination is
lacking in Bagamoyo District.
Conversely, formal contractual arrangements such as
SLAs, are expected to address every future contingency
including the intended quality of services [11, 34]. The
absence of written contractual agreements with current
partnerships in this district highlights how collaboration
Kamugumya and Olivier BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:596 Page 10 of 13
with non-state actors is usually initiated at a local level.
It is argued that such partnerships do not take into ac-
count the proper analysis of political, economic and so-
cial structures [6]. A lack of reliable and consistent data
to make informed decisions during PPP negotiations and
further performance management affect value creation
[31]. When non-state actors initiate partnership with the
local government (the case for most current and forming
collaborations in Bagamoyo District), such collaborations
tend to lose public interest as a result. As argued in the
application of agency theory [37, 52], and supported by
these findings, the local government may not have
enough capacity to monitor non-state actors, who may
decide to pursue their own interest. The local public sec-
tor turns out to be in a sub-ordinate role in such a situ-
ation, due to information asymmetry [10, 12].
Well-designed SLAs can improve risk allocation and
achieve value for money through reducing environmen-
tal uncertainties and compensating for market external-
ities [9–11]. On the other hand, the lack of a SLA may
impede providers’ behaviour that favours public interests
[37]. This study reveals non-state actors’ ‘moral hazards’
as a result of inappropriate distribution of risk and re-
wards. For example, restrictions on who should receive
services based on their ability to pay, and not on need,
by introducing cost sharing mechanism for RCHS that
would have been provided partly free of charge. Corres-
pondingly, some facilities are avoiding types of collabo-
rations that would require provision of RCHS. This is
contributed to by the failure to achieve the right balance
of interests and incentives [46]. For example, high trans-
action costs for setup and operation of a facility has been
highlighted to contribute to the inability to achieve
intended policy outcome [10].
It has been further highlighted that the extension of PPP
to a wider range of services requires consideration on how
incentives are aligned against administrative complexity
[10] - as such extension tends to come with increased
transaction cost [11, 34]. In this study, restricted flexibility
in spending is seen to deter prompt actions to address
evolving population need such as collaborating with private
providers to establish new RCHS, and improve physical
access to care for CHF members. This can also be attrib-
uted to a narrow local fiscal space, as more than 95 % of
the local total health expenditure is earmarked once the
CCHP has been approved by the central government. Since
this study focused on service organisation at the district
level, further studies could usefully look into central incen-
tives and governing rules to promote PPP at local levels.
Conclusion
PPP continues to offer promising results, however lim-
ited capacity of local government to make choices that
would improve health outcomes is highlighted as an
inhibiting factor of the national efforts to promote PPP.
Provision of public services by private providers without
formal contractual agreements limits the progress to-
wards attaining health goals through PPP. Uneven power
between stakeholders impedes inclusiveness of the
private sector in district strategic planning. A higher
governing body at the district level (that is expected to
have the private sector representation) is not empow-
ered to oversee other governing bodies in strategic
decision-making. As more efforts continue to be put
into promoting the private sector, local governments
need to orient themselves towards collaborative efforts
that create value and enable its distribution rather than
just licensing and regulation.
This case study provides insights on how to strengthen
policy implementation at the sub-national level, and
strengthen the district health systems as a result of PPP.
As the role of the private sector in contributing to public
social goals is increasingly gaining recognition in LMICs,
this study underscores a need for a type of social ar-
rangement that is underpinned by shared values and em-
bedded in a broader society and economy [53]. These
types of social arrangements should support centrally
coordinated national PPP initiatives, and facilitate inte-
grative collaboration at the local level that forms a basis
for governance decisions.
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